仕組み
記録は、それを撮影した端末の上で封印されます。ファイルを受け取った人は、アカウントなしで、ファイルをどこにも送らずに、その封印を確認できます。
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ハッシュ
ハッシュとは、ファイルの全バイトから計算される短い数値です。1 バイトでも変われば数値が変わります。撮影時に、端末は作ったばかりのファイルの SHA-256 ハッシュを計算します。
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封印
端末は、そのハッシュと撮影時の事実から作ったダイジェストに、自身が保持し外に出さない秘密鍵で署名します。この署名が封印で、公開鍵があれば誰でも確認でき、秘密鍵がなければ誰にも作れません。別の鍵を持つ別の端末は別のファイルを封印できるので、確認が示すのは、封印が保たれバイト列が変わっていないことであって、誰が鍵を持っているかではありません。
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タイムスタンプ
記録がタイムスタンプを持つ場合、タイムスタンプ局が「このファイルのハッシュは指定の時刻に存在した」と署名しています。これは記録の古さの下限であり、端末を持っていた本人以外が付けたものです。
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確認
このページは、あなたの手元のバイト列からハッシュを計算し、記録された撮影時の事実からダイジェストを組み直し、記録の中の公開鍵で署名を確認します。それぞれが結果の中の別々の行になります。
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結果の読み方
各行は「確認済み」「一致しません」「利用不可」のいずれかです。確認済みとは撮影と完全性のことで、このバイト列がその鍵で封印され、以来変わっていないことを指します。写っているものが本物だという意味には決してなりません。
仕様
このページの残りでは、すべての判定項目、バンドルが従う契約、証明書コードの正確な限界を挙げます。
この文書は英語のみです。結果の意味を説明するページはあなたの言語で用意されています。
Every line in a result
A result is not a yes or a no. It is a list of independent lines, each with its own answer, in the order the verification core runs them. Some lines have to verify before a record can read as verified. The rest add corroboration when they are there, and say nothing when they are not.
| Line | Weight | What it proves |
|---|---|---|
| scheme | Required | The record names a sealing scheme this core implements. |
| content | Required | The SHA-256 hash of the bytes you supplied equals the hash in the record. |
| digest | Required | The digest rebuilt from the recorded capture facts equals the digest that was signed. |
| signature | Required | The ECDSA P-256 signature verifies over that digest, under the public key in the record. |
| public_key | Optional | The public key parsed and lies on the curve. |
| timestamp | Optional | A time-stamp authority whose certificate chains to a pinned root signed that this content hash existed at the stated time, and that certificate was valid at that time. |
| ots_structure | Optional | Replaying the OpenTimestamps proof from this record reaches the commitment the record records. |
| ots | Optional | A Bitcoin anchor is present. Whether that block commits to it is not checked here. |
| cosignatures | Optional | Every stored witness or receipt countersignature still verifies over the same digest. |
| aux_assets | Optional | The secondary files, the capture signals and the bundle index agree with each other and with what you hashed. |
| pq | Optional | A post-quantum signature is present. It is carried, not verified here. |
| pair, pair_records | Mixed | A dual-capture sidecar carries a signature that verifies, and it binds these two records. |
| bundle_signature, bundle_completeness | Mixed | The exported file list carries a signature that verifies, and the files beside it match it. |
| chain_integrity, chain_coverage | Mixed | The locker ledger re-hashes and links, and every record present has an entry. |
| witness_signature | Required | A witness countersignature verifies over the record it names. |
Three words, and how they add up
Each line reads verified, does not match, or not available. The whole record reads as follows, and the rule is written once in the verification core rather than in this page.
- If any line failed, the record reads does not match.
- Otherwise, if every required line verified, the record reads verified.
- Otherwise the record reads not available.
A missing optional lane never lowers a verdict. A record with no witness countersignature is less corroborated, not less valid. A lane that is present and broken does lower it, because a countersignature that no longer verifies is evidence of a problem rather than an absence.
Not available is never verified. If you did not supply the file, the first line cannot run, and the record reads not available. That state is not painted green anywhere on this site.
Damaged is not changed
A file that cannot be read at all is a different answer from a file whose seal did not hold. Unreadable input is reported as damaged: the record could not be parsed, the calendar date in it does not exist, the payload was too large. A failed line means the evidence itself did not hold up.
The same rule applies inside a record. A time-stamp token or a countersignature this core cannot parse is reported as not available and leaves the verdict alone. Only one that parses and then fails a check reads as failed.
What a bundle contains
A single file can be checked on its own if you also have its manifest. An exported bundle is a folder that carries everything a reviewer needs.
| File | What it holds |
|---|---|
| the asset | The sealed file itself, byte for byte as it was sealed. |
| manifest.json | The hash, the signature, the public key, the signed digest and the capture facts. |
| audit.json | What the app did to produce the export. |
| certificate.pdf | The printable sheet, carrying the code that opens this page. |
| export-manifest.json | A signed list of every file in the bundle, so the bundle proves its own completeness. |
| aux assets | Secondary sealed files where the capture made them, such as a depth map or a motion trace. |
A missing file, a file whose hash does not match, and an unlisted extra file are all reported. An extra file in an evidence bundle is a finding, not a convenience.
The printed code, and its limit
A certificate carries a code that opens this page. The record's identifying payload rides after the # in the address, and a fragment is never sent to a server by any browser. The host of this site sees that the page was requested, as it would for any page, and is never told which record the code named.
The payload carries the record id, the content hash, the scheme, the public key and the signature. It does not carry the signed digest or the capture facts that digest covers, so a code on its own cannot be checked cryptographically. It identifies a record. It is not proof that a file you hold is that record, and this page never shows it as verified on its own.
Bring the file as well and the code becomes useful: the content hash in the code can be compared with the hash of the bytes in front of you.
Two cameras, one event
A dual capture is not one picture. Each camera's file is sealed on its own, and a signed sidecar binds the two records together. Verification asks two questions separately: whether the sidecar's signature verifies, and whether it binds these two records. Any composite image made from the pair is a derived file, and is never the original.
Documents and statements are records too
A sealed document is one PDF, assembled before it is sealed, so the signature covers the pages, the form fields and the signature strokes exactly as they appear. A statement seals its transcript as canonical JSON. Both take the same path a photograph takes, and are checked by the same lines.
A file that was imported rather than captured says so inside the sealed material itself, in the line that the signature covers. Sealing an imported file records when it entered the app. It does not attest where it came from.
The trust page carries the algorithms, the pinned roots, the threat model and the known limits.