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信頼

確認済みの結果が示すこと、示さないこと、そして私たちを介さずに同じ結果に到達する方法。

この文書は英語のみです。結果の意味を説明するページはあなたの言語で用意されています。

What is proven

A verified record proves that these exact bytes were sealed by the key shown, that the capture facts recorded beside them have not changed since, and, where a time stamp is present, that an authority other than the capturing device attested that this content hash existed at the stated time.

It does not prove what the picture shows, who was holding the device, or that the scene in front of the lens was what it appeared to be. A camera can be pointed at a screen. Provenance answers where a file came from and whether it changed. It does not answer whether the world matched it, and nothing on this site will ever claim that it does.

The four lines that must verify before a record reads as verified.
LineWhat it proves
scheme The record names a sealing scheme this core implements.
content The SHA-256 hash of the bytes supplied equals the hash recorded in the manifest.
digest The digest rebuilt from the recorded capture facts equals the digest that was signed.
signature The ECDSA P-256 signature verifies over that digest under the public key in the record.

Optional lines add corroboration: a time stamp, an independent anchor, witness countersignatures, secondary files, the bundle's own completeness, the locker ledger. An absent optional line never lowers a verdict. A present and broken one does. The full list of lines is on the how it works page.

What we do not hold

The strongest sentence a company can write about your data is that it never had it. This one is structural rather than a policy, which means it is not a promise that could be changed by a later decision.

  • There is no account system. There is nothing to sign in to.
  • There is no database, no file storage and no upload endpoint. This site is static files.
  • The file you check is read by code running in your browser. It is never sent anywhere.
  • There is no analytics of any kind, no cookie, and no third-party script, font, image or embed.
  • The part of a certificate address after the hash character is never transmitted by any browser, so even a scanned certificate does not tell a server which record you looked at.

One party does see something, and pretending otherwise would undo the rest of the page: the host serving this site receives the request for each page, as any web server does. This site is served by Vercel, and what that means is written out on the privacy page.

The apps make two network calls, both optional and both carrying a hash rather than your media: a request for a signed time stamp, and an OpenTimestamps submission. A hash cannot be turned back into the file it came from.

Continuity

Certificates printed today point at this address and will keep pointing at it. That makes the address a dependency, and a dependency that can disappear is a defect in an evidence product. Four things are arranged so that a verification outlives us.

  • The site is a static export. There is no server to keep running, no database to migrate and no service to renew. A copy of these files serves the same pages.
  • The verification runs in your browser, in a WebAssembly build of the same core the apps use. It needs no network once the page has loaded.
  • The evidence format is written down and frozen. The signing digest never changes; new capability arrives only as optional fields that are never part of what was signed. A record sealed today decodes forever.
  • An archive build packages the verify page, the core, the fonts and a checksum file as one folder, so the check can be repeated from your own disk with no network at all. Download the archive, unzip it and open index.html. Its README.txt names the SHA-256 of the core it carries, and SHA256SUMS lists every file in it, so a copy can be checked against the one published here.

The algorithms are public standards, so a reviewer who distrusts every piece of our code can still verify a record: hash the file with any SHA-256 implementation, rebuild the digest from the documented byte layout, and check the signature with any P-256 library.

Reproducibility

A verdict that cannot be repeated is an opinion. Everything this page produces is built to be repeated by somebody else, later, without asking us anything.

  • A result can be downloaded as a report document with a frozen shape: schema 1, the lines in the order the core ran them, the status and reason of each written as stable names rather than numbers, and the version of the core that produced it.
  • Reading a report back re-derives the overall verdict from the lines rather than believing the stored one, so an edited verdict does not survive the round trip.
  • Reason codes are stable identifiers. They are appended to, never renamed and never repurposed, so a report stored in a case file still means in five years what it meant when it was written.
  • The acceptance test of this site is byte identity: for every entry in the conformance corpus, the report for every lane produced in a real browser here must match the core's own tooling byte for byte. The corpus is append-only and an expected value is never edited.

Threat model

Two different questions live under this heading. The first is what an attacker who controls this website could do to you. The second is what an attacker holding a record could do to it.

This site

If someone controls this address, they can serve a page that reports whatever they like. No web page can prove its own honesty to its reader, and a verifier that claimed otherwise would be the first thing to disbelieve. What the design does is reduce what that attacker gains and give you somewhere else to stand.

  • There is no server code and no stored data here, so compromising the host yields no files, no accounts and no history of who checked what.
  • The deployed content policy allows code, styles, fonts and network connections from this origin and from nowhere else, and allows images and media only from this origin or from data the page built itself, which is how a thumbnail of the file you dropped is drawn without it leaving your device. No third party can be the way in, because there are no third parties.
  • The archived verifier and the open core let the same check run somewhere this attacker does not control. A result you doubt can be reproduced on your own machine.
  • The printed certificate carries the content hash in readable characters. You can compare it by eye with the output of any hashing tool, which is a check no website can forge.

The record

What someone holding a record can attempt, and what the result says.
AttemptResult
Change a byte of the file The content line fails. This is the whole point of the hash.
Change a recorded capture fact The digest line fails: the digest covers the device model, the capture time, the time zone, the dual-camera flag, the description and the coordinates.
Replace the signature alone The signature line fails.
Replace the key and the signature together The record verifies under the new key. The seal proves that one key sealed these bytes, not whose key it was. See the second known limit.
Remove the seal entirely There is nothing to check. The result reads not supplied, and it is never green.
Point a printed code at a different file The code carries a content hash but its signature does not cover that hash, so a code alone is never shown as verified.
Set the device clock back before capture The recorded capture time moves, because a device asserts its own clock. A time stamp does not move: it is signed by someone else.
Delete a record from a locker The locker ledger still carries its entry. Deleting a record never edits the chain.
Re-encrypt or re-wrap a bundle Opening a locked share proves only that the recipient key opened it. The evidence inside is verified separately, by the same lines.

Algorithms and roots

Every algorithm this verification depends on.
PurposeAlgorithm
Content hash SHA-256 over the asset bytes.
Signing digest SHA-256 over a frozen byte layout of the content hash and the capture facts.
Signature ECDSA P-256 over SHA-256. DER and raw 64-byte encodings are both accepted and the result says which it read.
Public key X9.63 uncompressed, 65 bytes, or P-256 SPKI, 91 bytes.
Time stamps RFC 3161 tokens. The message imprint is SHA-256 for every request this product makes.
Independent anchoring OpenTimestamps. The proof structure is replayed here; the Bitcoin block is not.
Recipient-locked shares HPKE with X25519, SHA-256 and ChaCha20-Poly1305. The header bytes are the additional data, so editing the header breaks decryption.

Time stamps are checked against a small table of roots pinned inside the verification core by SHA-256 fingerprint. The operating system's root store is not consulted, so a root added to your machine by someone else cannot make a time stamp verify here.

The roots a time stamp may chain to.
RootHow it is recognised
Apple Root CA Pinned by SHA-256 fingerprint.
DigiCert Assured ID Root CA Pinned by SHA-256 fingerprint.
DigiCert Trusted Root G4 Pinned by SHA-256 fingerprint.
FreeTSA Root CA Pinned by SHA-256 fingerprint.

The table is append-only. An entry is never removed, because removing one would stop already-issued tokens from verifying, and evidence does not become less true when a certificate ages. A certificate's validity is checked against the time the token asserts, never against today, for the same reason.

Known limits

Listed because a reviewer will find them anyway, and finding them here is a different experience from finding them alone.

  1. Revocation is not checked. This page makes no network requests, so whether a time-stamp certificate was withdrawn after it signed is not known here. Every verified time-stamp line says so.
  2. A record is self-signed. The signature proves that one key sealed these bytes. It does not name the holder of that key. Binding a key to a particular device needs device attestation, and the shipped iPhone build does not have that entitlement enabled, so this site does not claim it. The manifest carries a slot for it, and the slot is deliberately outside what the signature covers.
  3. One authority currently signs with SHA-1. Apple's time-stamp service signs its token with rsa-pkcs1v15-sha1. The core verifies it and names the algorithm rather than hiding it. The imprint binding that token to the record is SHA-256 either way. The wording this page should use about it is a decision the owner has not yet made, so the page states the algorithm and nothing more.
  4. A certificate code alone identifies a record. It is not proof about a file, and this site never paints it green.
  5. Absent coordinates are indistinguishable from zero. Inside the frozen digest a missing latitude or longitude is encoded as positive zero, so "no location" and "latitude 0, longitude 0" hash identically. A future scheme would add a presence flag; changing the existing one would break every record already sealed.
  6. A Bitcoin anchor is reported, not verified. The proof's structure is replayed here, which proves the proof is about this record. Whether the named block commits to it needs a block header chain, which needs a network.
  7. A post-quantum signature lane is carried, not verified here. It is reported as present. The P-256 signature remains the one that decides.
  8. Content Credentials are not read on this site. C2PA findings would never feed this verdict in any case: green is reserved for the frozen chain above.
  9. The capture time is the device's own clock. Only a time stamp is set by someone else, and only where the record carries one.
  10. Nothing here detects whether an image was generated. Detection is probabilistic and gets worse every year. This product answers the question a different way, by recording where a file came from at the moment it came from there, and a record that carries no seal simply carries no seal.

Documents

Four documents matter to an evaluator, and all four exist: the evidence format contract, which is normative and append-only; the verification core's API, which describes every line a result can contain; the frozen test vectors, which are the mechanical form of the contract; and this page. Published copies of the first three land with the archive build. Until then, ask for them at info@mrwise.ca.

A verification receipt produced on this site is a record of a reproducible process. It is not signed by anyone and it says so on its face. It supplies the material a qualified person may rely on when making a certification: the hash algorithm and the hash of each file, the signature algorithm and the public key, the time-stamp authority and the time it asserted, and the version of the core that produced the report.

In the United States, Federal Rule of Evidence 902(14) allows data copied from an electronic device to be self-authenticating when authenticated by a process of digital identification, as shown by a certification of a qualified person. In Canada, sections 31.1 to 31.3 of the Canada Evidence Act put the burden of authenticity on the party tendering an electronic document, and allow the best evidence rule to be satisfied by proof of the integrity of the system. This page describes where the fields may be relevant. It is not legal advice, and whether a record is admitted is always a decision for the court.