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So funktioniert es

Eine Aufzeichnung wird auf dem Gerät versiegelt, das sie aufgenommen hat. Wer die Datei erhält, kann dieses Siegel prüfen, ohne Konto und ohne die Datei irgendwohin zu senden.

  1. Der Hash

    Ein Hash ist eine kurze Zahl, die aus jedem Byte einer Datei berechnet wird. Ändert sich ein Byte, ändert sich die Zahl. Bei der Aufnahme berechnet das Gerät den SHA-256-Hash der Datei, die es gerade erstellt hat.

  2. Das Siegel

    Das Gerät signiert einen Digest aus diesem Hash und den Aufnahmedaten mit einem privaten Schlüssel, den es hält und nie herausgibt, und diese Signatur ist das Siegel. Jeder mit dem öffentlichen Schlüssel kann sie prüfen, und ohne den privaten Schlüssel kann sie niemand erzeugen. Ein anderes Gerät mit einem anderen Schlüssel kann eine andere Datei versiegeln, eine Prüfung belegt also, dass das Siegel unversehrt und die Bytes unverändert sind, nicht wer den Schlüssel hält.

  3. Der Zeitstempel

    Trägt eine Aufzeichnung einen Zeitstempel, so hat eine Zeitstempelstelle signiert, dass der Hash dieser Datei zu einer genannten Zeit existierte. Das ist eine untere Schranke für das Alter, gesetzt von jemand anderem als der Person mit dem Telefon.

  4. Die Prüfung

    Diese Seite bildet den Hash der Bytes, die Sie haben, baut den Digest aus den aufgezeichneten Aufnahmedaten neu und prüft die Signatur gegen den öffentlichen Schlüssel in der Aufzeichnung. Jeder dieser Schritte ist eine eigene Zeile im Ergebnis.

  5. Was ein Ergebnis bedeutet

    Eine Zeile lautet geprüft, stimmt nicht überein oder nicht verfügbar. Geprüft heißt Aufnahme und Unversehrtheit: Diese Bytes wurden mit diesem Schlüssel versiegelt und sind seitdem unverändert. Es heißt nie, dass das Gezeigte echt ist.

Die Spezifikation

Der Rest dieser Seite benennt jedes Prüfkriterium, den Vertrag, dem ein Paket folgt, und die genauen Grenzen eines Zertifikatscodes.

Dieses Dokument liegt nur auf Englisch vor. Die Seiten, die erklären, was ein Ergebnis bedeutet, gibt es in Ihrer Sprache.

Every line in a result

A result is not a yes or a no. It is a list of independent lines, each with its own answer, in the order the verification core runs them. Some lines have to verify before a record can read as verified. The rest add corroboration when they are there, and say nothing when they are not.

The lines a result can contain, and what each one proves.
LineWeightWhat it proves
scheme RequiredThe record names a sealing scheme this core implements.
content RequiredThe SHA-256 hash of the bytes you supplied equals the hash in the record.
digest RequiredThe digest rebuilt from the recorded capture facts equals the digest that was signed.
signature RequiredThe ECDSA P-256 signature verifies over that digest, under the public key in the record.
public_key OptionalThe public key parsed and lies on the curve.
timestamp OptionalA time-stamp authority whose certificate chains to a pinned root signed that this content hash existed at the stated time, and that certificate was valid at that time.
ots_structure OptionalReplaying the OpenTimestamps proof from this record reaches the commitment the record records.
ots OptionalA Bitcoin anchor is present. Whether that block commits to it is not checked here.
cosignatures OptionalEvery stored witness or receipt countersignature still verifies over the same digest.
aux_assets OptionalThe secondary files, the capture signals and the bundle index agree with each other and with what you hashed.
pq OptionalA post-quantum signature is present. It is carried, not verified here.
pair, pair_records MixedA dual-capture sidecar carries a signature that verifies, and it binds these two records.
bundle_signature, bundle_completeness MixedThe exported file list carries a signature that verifies, and the files beside it match it.
chain_integrity, chain_coverage MixedThe locker ledger re-hashes and links, and every record present has an entry.
witness_signature RequiredA witness countersignature verifies over the record it names.

Three words, and how they add up

Each line reads verified, does not match, or not available. The whole record reads as follows, and the rule is written once in the verification core rather than in this page.

  • If any line failed, the record reads does not match.
  • Otherwise, if every required line verified, the record reads verified.
  • Otherwise the record reads not available.

A missing optional lane never lowers a verdict. A record with no witness countersignature is less corroborated, not less valid. A lane that is present and broken does lower it, because a countersignature that no longer verifies is evidence of a problem rather than an absence.

Not available is never verified. If you did not supply the file, the first line cannot run, and the record reads not available. That state is not painted green anywhere on this site.

Damaged is not changed

A file that cannot be read at all is a different answer from a file whose seal did not hold. Unreadable input is reported as damaged: the record could not be parsed, the calendar date in it does not exist, the payload was too large. A failed line means the evidence itself did not hold up.

The same rule applies inside a record. A time-stamp token or a countersignature this core cannot parse is reported as not available and leaves the verdict alone. Only one that parses and then fails a check reads as failed.

What a bundle contains

A single file can be checked on its own if you also have its manifest. An exported bundle is a folder that carries everything a reviewer needs.

The files in an exported evidence bundle.
FileWhat it holds
the asset The sealed file itself, byte for byte as it was sealed.
manifest.json The hash, the signature, the public key, the signed digest and the capture facts.
audit.json What the app did to produce the export.
certificate.pdf The printable sheet, carrying the code that opens this page.
export-manifest.json A signed list of every file in the bundle, so the bundle proves its own completeness.
aux assets Secondary sealed files where the capture made them, such as a depth map or a motion trace.

A missing file, a file whose hash does not match, and an unlisted extra file are all reported. An extra file in an evidence bundle is a finding, not a convenience.

The printed code, and its limit

A certificate carries a code that opens this page. The record's identifying payload rides after the # in the address, and a fragment is never sent to a server by any browser. The host of this site sees that the page was requested, as it would for any page, and is never told which record the code named.

The payload carries the record id, the content hash, the scheme, the public key and the signature. It does not carry the signed digest or the capture facts that digest covers, so a code on its own cannot be checked cryptographically. It identifies a record. It is not proof that a file you hold is that record, and this page never shows it as verified on its own.

Bring the file as well and the code becomes useful: the content hash in the code can be compared with the hash of the bytes in front of you.

Two cameras, one event

A dual capture is not one picture. Each camera's file is sealed on its own, and a signed sidecar binds the two records together. Verification asks two questions separately: whether the sidecar's signature verifies, and whether it binds these two records. Any composite image made from the pair is a derived file, and is never the original.

Documents and statements are records too

A sealed document is one PDF, assembled before it is sealed, so the signature covers the pages, the form fields and the signature strokes exactly as they appear. A statement seals its transcript as canonical JSON. Both take the same path a photograph takes, and are checked by the same lines.

A file that was imported rather than captured says so inside the sealed material itself, in the line that the signature covers. Sealing an imported file records when it entered the app. It does not attest where it came from.

The trust page carries the algorithms, the pinned roots, the threat model and the known limits.