工作原理
记录在拍摄它的那台设备上被封存。收到文件的人可以核验这个封印,不需要账号,也不必把文件发往任何地方。
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哈希
哈希是根据文件的每一个字节算出的一个短数值。只要有一个字节变了,这个数值就会变。拍摄时,设备会计算刚生成的这份文件的 SHA-256 哈希。
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封印
设备用一把自己保管、从不交出的私钥,为这个哈希和拍摄事实组成的摘要签名,这个签名就是封印。任何拿到公钥的人都能核验它,而没有私钥的人无法生成它。另一台设备用另一把密钥同样可以封存另一份文件,所以核验说明的是封印完好、字节未变,而不是谁持有这把密钥。
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时间戳
如果一份记录带有时间戳,就说明某个时间戳机构签署过一份声明:这份文件的哈希在指定时刻已经存在。这是记录年龄的下限,而且由手持这台手机的人以外的一方给出。
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核验
此页面会计算你手上这些字节的哈希,用记录下来的拍摄事实重建摘要,并用记录里的公钥核验签名。每一步在结果中都是单独的一行。
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结果怎么读
每一行会是「已核验」「不匹配」或「不可用」。已核验指的是拍摄与完整性:这些字节由那把密钥封存,此后没有改动。它绝不表示画面里的东西是真的。
规范
本页其余部分列出每一项判定、文件包所遵循的契约,以及证书码的确切界限。
本文件只有英文版。解释结果含义的页面有你的语言版本。
Every line in a result
A result is not a yes or a no. It is a list of independent lines, each with its own answer, in the order the verification core runs them. Some lines have to verify before a record can read as verified. The rest add corroboration when they are there, and say nothing when they are not.
| Line | Weight | What it proves |
|---|---|---|
| scheme | Required | The record names a sealing scheme this core implements. |
| content | Required | The SHA-256 hash of the bytes you supplied equals the hash in the record. |
| digest | Required | The digest rebuilt from the recorded capture facts equals the digest that was signed. |
| signature | Required | The ECDSA P-256 signature verifies over that digest, under the public key in the record. |
| public_key | Optional | The public key parsed and lies on the curve. |
| timestamp | Optional | A time-stamp authority whose certificate chains to a pinned root signed that this content hash existed at the stated time, and that certificate was valid at that time. |
| ots_structure | Optional | Replaying the OpenTimestamps proof from this record reaches the commitment the record records. |
| ots | Optional | A Bitcoin anchor is present. Whether that block commits to it is not checked here. |
| cosignatures | Optional | Every stored witness or receipt countersignature still verifies over the same digest. |
| aux_assets | Optional | The secondary files, the capture signals and the bundle index agree with each other and with what you hashed. |
| pq | Optional | A post-quantum signature is present. It is carried, not verified here. |
| pair, pair_records | Mixed | A dual-capture sidecar carries a signature that verifies, and it binds these two records. |
| bundle_signature, bundle_completeness | Mixed | The exported file list carries a signature that verifies, and the files beside it match it. |
| chain_integrity, chain_coverage | Mixed | The locker ledger re-hashes and links, and every record present has an entry. |
| witness_signature | Required | A witness countersignature verifies over the record it names. |
Three words, and how they add up
Each line reads verified, does not match, or not available. The whole record reads as follows, and the rule is written once in the verification core rather than in this page.
- If any line failed, the record reads does not match.
- Otherwise, if every required line verified, the record reads verified.
- Otherwise the record reads not available.
A missing optional lane never lowers a verdict. A record with no witness countersignature is less corroborated, not less valid. A lane that is present and broken does lower it, because a countersignature that no longer verifies is evidence of a problem rather than an absence.
Not available is never verified. If you did not supply the file, the first line cannot run, and the record reads not available. That state is not painted green anywhere on this site.
Damaged is not changed
A file that cannot be read at all is a different answer from a file whose seal did not hold. Unreadable input is reported as damaged: the record could not be parsed, the calendar date in it does not exist, the payload was too large. A failed line means the evidence itself did not hold up.
The same rule applies inside a record. A time-stamp token or a countersignature this core cannot parse is reported as not available and leaves the verdict alone. Only one that parses and then fails a check reads as failed.
What a bundle contains
A single file can be checked on its own if you also have its manifest. An exported bundle is a folder that carries everything a reviewer needs.
| File | What it holds |
|---|---|
| the asset | The sealed file itself, byte for byte as it was sealed. |
| manifest.json | The hash, the signature, the public key, the signed digest and the capture facts. |
| audit.json | What the app did to produce the export. |
| certificate.pdf | The printable sheet, carrying the code that opens this page. |
| export-manifest.json | A signed list of every file in the bundle, so the bundle proves its own completeness. |
| aux assets | Secondary sealed files where the capture made them, such as a depth map or a motion trace. |
A missing file, a file whose hash does not match, and an unlisted extra file are all reported. An extra file in an evidence bundle is a finding, not a convenience.
The printed code, and its limit
A certificate carries a code that opens this page. The record's identifying payload rides after the # in the address, and a fragment is never sent to a server by any browser. The host of this site sees that the page was requested, as it would for any page, and is never told which record the code named.
The payload carries the record id, the content hash, the scheme, the public key and the signature. It does not carry the signed digest or the capture facts that digest covers, so a code on its own cannot be checked cryptographically. It identifies a record. It is not proof that a file you hold is that record, and this page never shows it as verified on its own.
Bring the file as well and the code becomes useful: the content hash in the code can be compared with the hash of the bytes in front of you.
Two cameras, one event
A dual capture is not one picture. Each camera's file is sealed on its own, and a signed sidecar binds the two records together. Verification asks two questions separately: whether the sidecar's signature verifies, and whether it binds these two records. Any composite image made from the pair is a derived file, and is never the original.
Documents and statements are records too
A sealed document is one PDF, assembled before it is sealed, so the signature covers the pages, the form fields and the signature strokes exactly as they appear. A statement seals its transcript as canonical JSON. Both take the same path a photograph takes, and are checked by the same lines.
A file that was imported rather than captured says so inside the sealed material itself, in the line that the signature covers. Sealing an imported file records when it entered the app. It does not attest where it came from.
The trust page carries the algorithms, the pinned roots, the threat model and the known limits.